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This paper measures the impact of year one of the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Rural 
Business Development program for small rice farming households on the Pacific Coast of 
Nicaragua. The program was rolled out in the 2009-2010 agricultural year, which was the driest 
year on record in the region, likely due to an El Niño event. Estimated impacts show that the 
program at best had no effect, and at worst led to a 10 percent reduction in yields. These impacts 
are estimated using an econometric model which uses selection on observables as its identifying 
assumption, and robustness checks suggest that this is a reasonable approach in this case. 
Inference accounts for spatial correlation across households of the unobserved determinants of 
agricultural outcomes. The program appears to have been almost exclusively focused on 
increasing yields through better and greater application of chemical fertilizers, and minimization 
of losses in the post-harvest stages of production. If the pessimistic estimates of program effects 
are true, then the program could have been improved by incorporating risk management 
strategies into extension advice. On the other hand, farmers may be well insured against climatic 
risk, in which case they may have selected into the program knowing that they would be trading 
greater risk for higher expected returns. Survey data offers some evidence that the latter is indeed 
the case.1 
 
1  Introduction 
When thinking of interventions designed to combat rural poverty, agricultural extension and 
credit appear to be natural complements. By delivering knowledge to farmers about productivity 
enhancing techniques and the proper use of inputs, extension can increase returns to capital 
invested in agricultural activities or diminish risks associated with agriculture. At the same time, 
including credit as a component of an agricultural extension program can give farmers the 
resources necessary to fully exploit the knowledge gained via extension services, and bring 
households into the market for extension services that otherwise could not afford to participate.   
This essay evaluates year one of the two-year Rural Business Development (RBD) 
program for rice farmers in León and Chinandega, located on the Pacific Coast of Nicaragua. 
The program combines credit in the form of agricultural inputs with agricultural extension 
services tailored to individual farms.  The RBD program is funded jointly by the U.S. and 
Nicaraguan Governments, and is administered by the local office of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), a development agency of the U.S. Government.  
  Estimated impacts indicate that participants in the program…on average. XXX There are 
reasons to believe that these results are due to the combination of the nature of the benefits 
offered by the RBD program and the severe drought that occurred in the 2009-2010 agricultural 
year in the study area due to an El Niño event. The timing of rice planting decisions in León and 
Chinandega are such that the magnitude of the 2009-2010 El Niño event was not known until 
quite late in the growing season; the vast majority of farmers plant in July, which is when the 
presence of an El Niño event in 2009 was first confirmed, but its magnitude was not known until 
much later in the growing season (IRI 2009). xxx more on nature of extension advice and impact 
on yields they start planting in june, done in august. harvest November and december 2 
 
Failing to detect a positive impact in a drought year does not necessarily mean that 
farmers will not benefit from the program. Deciding whether or not to join an extension program 
that also offers credit may require weighing a tradeoff between higher expected returns and 
greater risk. Farmers might elect to participate in the RBD program because of gains from 
participation that occur over time in years characterized by favorable production conditions, 
while output in years with poor conditions for rice production could be unaffected or even 
decrease due to enrolling in the program.  
In the case of the RBD program, the skills learned via extension agents could be applied 
in future years in which conditions are more suitable for rice. Thus the complete stream of 
benefits due to the program cannot be captured in a static framework. However, the negative 
aspects of poor outcomes among participants also have dynamic implications. If farmers cannot 
meet their debt obligations out of income or by cutting consumption, and cooperatives enforce 
debt repayment, then a long-term deepening of poverty may occur if households sell off assets to 
meet debt obligations (Carter and Barrett 2006).  
Whether this outcome could obtain depends on how well insured households are against 
shocks; participants did XXX did not sell off assets to a significantly higher degree than non-
participants, and there was little change in asset holdings in general, suggesting that in this 
particular case households were sufficiently diversified. Alternatively, if the leaders of the 
various farmers’ cooperatives do not strictly enforce repayment, the result may be a decrease in 
the services that each cooperative can offer its members. This would also hurt farmers over time, 
but the impact would be spread out over the membership of each cooperative. XXX In either 
case, the implication is that a program combining extension services with credit ought to take the 3 
 
risks faced by households and the degree to which they are insured into account in program 
design.  
This paper adds to the literature on agricultural extension and credit interventions in 
developing country agriculture. Much has been written about agricultural extension in 
developing countries, and earlier work in this area in the context of developing economies is 
surveyed by Anderson and Feder (2004). When econometric methods have been employed, 
much of this literature reports high returns to investments in extension services, e.g., Bindlish 
and Evenson (1997). But as noted by Anderson and Feder, data quality and issues of econometric 
methodology give reason to doubt some of these results. As shown by Gautam and Anderson 
(1999), small changes to model specifications can drastically reduce high estimated returns to 
extension investments.  
Later studies have made improvements to econometric methodology, and several of these 
are summarized in Cerdán-Infantes, Maffioli, and Ubfal (2008). Studies such as those by 
Praneetvatakul and Waibel (2007) and Godtland et al. (2004) tend to find that extension services have 
had success with respect to knowledge transfer but mixed effects on productivity and income. 
Overall, the evidence for the benefits of extension to agriculture in developing countries is 
mixed, and this conclusion extends to the various modalities by which extension services can be 
delivered (Anderson and Feder 2007). 
  Rural credit markets are the subject of their own rich literature, but only a small portion 
of research has been aimed at measuring the effects of credit on agricultural productivity and 
incomes. Existing studies generally find positive effects of credit receipt and access on 
agricultural productivity and incomes, but magnitudes vary considerably. Carter (1989) finds 4 
 
weak evidence of a positive relationship between receipt of credit and farm income and 
productivity in Nicaragua. Feder et al. (1990) and Foltz (2004) find modest effects of relaxing 
credit constraints on households on output and incomes, the former in the case of rural China and 
the latter using a sample of Tunisian farms. Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) use a broader 
definition of credit rationing than that employed by Feder et al. and Foltz, expanding the group 
of rationed households to include those that exit the credit market due to transaction costs or 
unwillingness to bear the risk of losing collateral in case of default. They estimate much large 
impacts of eliminating credit constraints on farmers in rural Peru equal to an increase of 26 
percent in the value of output per hectare.  
As summarized by Del Carpio and Maredia (2009), there are a relative small number of 
rigorous impact evaluations of agricultural extension and rural credit market projects in the 
literature. Their survey of the literature from 2000 to early 2009 identified 20 studies of 
agricultural extension project and 10 addressing rural credit interventions that satisfied a few 
basic criteria for categorization as an impact evaluation.
1 When the scope of these studies is 
limited to evaluations of projects that combine extension services with credit, the number 
becomes smaller still. One recent example is Ashfar, Giné, and Karlan (2009), who evaluate the 
impact of DrumNet in Kenya, a program designed to increase participation of horticulturalists in 
export markets. The authors of that study randomly assign groups of farmers to treatments 
including extension services, extension with a joint liability loan, and no treatment. They find 
significant impacts of both versions of the program on production of export crops, formal 
financial market participation, and significant increases in income among first time growers of 
export crops.  
                                                 
1 Basic criteria for inclusion were 1) A focus on agriculture, 2) A defined agricultural intervention, 3) A clearly 
stated counterfactual (e.g., cannot measure impact simply by using a before and after comparison on a single group). 5 
 
This essay does not have the benefit of randomized assignment to treatment. Instead, the 
identification strategy employed is to assume that selection into the program is based on 
observable characteristics, and program effects are estimated using inverse propensity score 
weighting combined with linear regression (Wooldridge 2007). The soundness of this 
assumption is tested to the extent possible using available data, and results suggest that xxx. 
 The unique features of this paper are the conditions under which the RBD program was 
rolled out, and the use of spatial methods in conducting statistical inference. By evaluating the 
RBD program in the context of a severe and unexpected climatic shock, the results of the 
analysis can serve as a cautionary tale for design of future programs. In conducting inference, 
standard errors are estimated using the spatial heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust 
covariance (HAC) matrix of Kelejian and Prucha (2007). A review of the literature uncovered no 
previously published impact evaluations in agricultural development that account for spatial 
autocorrelation.  
In what follows, Section X describes the study area of León and Chinandega and the 
characteristics of the RBD program. Section X describes the estimation strategy employed. 
Section X reports estimation results and robustness checks, and Section X concludes. 
2  The Rural Business Development program
2 
2.1  The Study Area and the goals and benefits of the RBD program 
León and Chinandega are home to around 830,000 persons, 39 percent of which live in rural 
areas and are involved in agriculture. Nearly all smallholder agriculture is rainfed, with the vast 
majority of irrigated hectares under the control of large agribusinesses, usually sugarcane or 
                                                 
2 This section and the one that follows draw from documentation provided by the Nicaragua office of MCC, and are 
available from the MCC Nicaragua website (http://www.cuentadelmilenio.org.ni) or from the author.  6 
 
plantain. Along with sesame seeds, maize, and sorghum, rice is one of the primary crops planted 
by small farms in the region.  
There are essentially two levels of benefits to the RBD rice program: cooperative-level 
benefits and individual-level benefits. Rice farmers participating in the RBD program are all 
members of cooperatives, and cooperatives with members in the program receive bundles of 
inputs for rice production sufficient for three manzanas
3 per participating farmer from MCC. 
These inputs are then leant out to participating members; interest rates on these loans vary across 
cooperatives, as credit contract details are controlled by cooperatives rather than MCC. While 
the input packets are meant to spur production in the short term, they are also designed to help 
each cooperative establish a rotating credit fund that will make liquidity available to farmers at in 
future years. For each participating cooperative, MCC pays a maximum of 30 percent of the 
costs associated with the program; the rest is paid for by the cooperative.  
  At the level of the producer, the RBD program for rice farmers also features benefits in 
the form of agricultural extension services, focused on tailoring the use of chemical fertilizers to 
the soil characteristics of each individual farm, more efficient use of agrochemicals meant to 
control threats to the plant, and on better management of the post-harvest stages of production. 
The costs of this technical assistance are factored into the portion of the total cost of program 
participation borne by each participating cooperative.  
2.2  Eligibility criteria and participation in the RBD program 
For rice farmers, participation in the RBD consists of several stages, the first of which is 
satisfying eligibility for participation in the program. Eligibility criteria include: 
·  The producer has planted or currently has at least 2 manzanas of rice. 
                                                 
3 1 manzana = 1.72 acres = 0.70 hectares 7 
 
·  Area of farm must be between 2 and 50 manzanas, non-irrigated. 
·  The main rice parcel must be property of the beneficiary.  
·  The main rice parcel must be outside environmentally sensitive areas. 
·  The beneficiary must be at least 20 years of age. 
As indicated by the eligibility criteria, the program targeted rice farmers with some degree of 
experience with the crop, and also focused on small non-irrigated farms. Forcing farmers to own 
their own land might rule out some of the poorest households in the area, but this restriction 
makes sense in the context of plot-specific extension services if permanent increases in 
productivity are to be achieved. As will be discussed in more detail when describing the data set, 
these criteria were not strictly enforced in the first year, particularly with regards to land tenure 
status. This evaluation focuses on farmers who did satisfy program participation criteria.  
Rice farmers interested in participating in the RBD program submitted requests for 
assistance to their cooperatives. The cooperatives then organized these requests into a single 
business plan that was submitted to the MCC office in Nicaragua for approval. The plans 
business plans themselves are at the cooperative level but are essentially collections of requests 
made by individual farms to participate in the RBD program. Whether or not an individual 
farmer participates in the program depends upon the decision made by MCC with regard to the 
business plan submitted by his or her cooperative.  
3  Outcomes and parameters of interest  
The goal of this evaluation is to estimate the average impact of the RBD program on participants; 
that is, the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) for a set of outcome variables. Altering the 
sample to exclude farmers not satisfying program criteria affects the interpretation of the ATT 
estimate, in that it will capture average effects on participants for the population satisfying 8 
 
program criteria. In addition, estimated impacts will capture effects on farmers who planted rice 
in 2009, rather than the entire population of farmers who meet program criteria; there are 243 
such farmers in the sample of 300.
4  
  I focus on three outcomes of interest: rice yields, revenues from growing rice, and net 
rice revenue; revenues minus costs are referred to as net revenue rather than profit since family 
labor is priced at the market wage, and it is not clear that this is equal to the opportunity cost of 
time for all households. Yields are measured in kilograms of output of unprocessed rice (i.e., wet 
and with the husk still attached) per sown hectare of land. Ignoring program costs not borne by 
the household, the ideal outcome of interest from the perspective of analyzing impacts of a 
program on welfare is arguably consumption.  
While better measures of welfare exist than the outcomes listed above, there are good 
reasons for concentrating on agricultural variables. Firstly, the main goal of the program is to 
address poverty among small rice farmers in León and Chinandega. The program is designed to 
accomplish this by making information, credit, and high quality inputs available to farmers, 
thereby removing the constraints keeping them from becoming more commercially successful. If 
no increase in productivity, revenues, or net revenue were detected among participants, this 
would not necessarily indicate that households had failed to receive any benefit from the 
program.  But it would at the very least suggest that the program had not worked as intended, and 
that more effective means of improving household welfare likely exist.  
                                                 
4 Four farmers that were not members of eligible cooperatives reported being participants in the RBD program. 
Their names were cross-checked against databases maintained by MCA in Nicaragua, and this could not be verified. 
These households were dropped from the sample used in the analysis, leaving 243 rice planters. The results reported 
are robust to their inclusion, however.  9 
 
Secondly, the survey data contain a measure of rice yields pre and post-RBD. As will be 
discussed later on in more detail, an implication of the identifying assumptions made in the 
econometric analysis of the RBD program presented here is that one should not detect any 
impact of the treatment on outcomes that could not have been affected by participation in the 
RBD program. For example, suppose we were to estimate the effect of participation in the RBD 
program on lagged yields. If the model has adequately controlled for differences between 
treatment and control households, we should detect no significant difference in pre-program 
yields across these two groups. If we do find a difference, this would strongly suggest the 
presence of unobservable factors correlated with RBD participation and the outcome of interest 
being modeled. Detecting significant differences would not require that we abandon all hope 
with regard to recovering unbiased estimates of program impacts, but it would suggest adjusting 
the modeling approach to incorporate information on outcomes prior to rollout of the RBD 
program.  
Given that poverty reduction is the goal of the program, one could argue that the 
emphasis of this evaluation should be on changes in net revenue due to the RBD program, and 
that inclusion of yields and revenue as outcomes of interest is redundant. These latter two 
variables are included for two reasons: the availability of data on lagged yields, and because data 
on yields and revenue are likely to be of substantially higher quality than data on costs. Data 
collection was done through a single visit to each household shortly after the harvest. Gathering 
accurate data on input use would likely require multiple visits throughout the duration of the 
agricultural year. Furthermore, data on costs associated with technical assistance received 
outside of the RBD program are lacking. xxx I estimate impacts of the RBD program on profits 
both ignoring outside technical assistance, and valuing it the average price per farm for extension 10 
 
services given to RBD participants as reported in administrative data provided by MCC. The 
results are not sensitive to inclusion of this component of costs.  
Furthermore, while the RBD program paid a maximum of 30 percent of the combined 
costs of the inputs used in loans and the agricultural extension services delivered to participating 
farmers, these savings were at the level of the cooperative; there is no information available on 
the distribution of these discounts across farmers. If we are willing to assume that farmers are 
able to sell inputs received from the program as they please, then market prices will represent the 
opportunity cost per unit of each input; given this assumption, using market prices to construct 
net revenue for the whole sample will not be problematic.  
Extension services are more troublesome. Administrative data provided by MCC list an 
average cost for four months of extension services per farm of $20.00. In calculating profits, this 
figure was deducted out of revenues for each RBD participant. The bottom line is that there are 
sources of error in the available data for production costs, and these errors vary by treatment 
status. As a result, there is good reason to look at several indicators of program impacts on rice 
production, some of which may be more reliable than others.  
4  Identifying assumptions and estimation technique 
4.1  Inverse propensity score weighting 
The evaluation of programs where participation is not random is complicated by the fact that 
outcomes of interest may be correlated with household characteristics which are also driving the 
participation decision. Suppose we would like to estimate the ATT of the RBD program for a 
given outcome of interest. Merely comparing participants and non-participants will yield a 
biased estimate of the ATT. For example, if more talented farmers have a higher probability of 
participating in RBD, and they also have higher crop yields, then a comparison of participant and 11 
 
non-participant households would attribute too great an effect to the RBD program; part of the 
observed difference in yields ought to be attributed to the difference in farming ability in the two 
groups. 
Here I will attempt to control for these confounding factors via the Inverse Propensity 
Score-Weighted Least Squares method (IPS-WLS). The ATT is equal to the average outcome 
among the subsample of participants when receiving the treatment, minus the average outcome 
among this same group when the treatment is not available. This first average is observed in the 
dataset, but the second must be estimated using the subsample of non-participant households. In 
order to do so, the following assumption is made: 
Assumption 1 - Unconfoundedness 
Let
1
i y represent the outcome of interest for household i when treatment is received and
0
i y denote 
the outcome without participation in the RBD program. Let 1 i d =  represent membership in the 
treatment group and 0 i d = for all non-participant households. Holding observed characteristics 
constant, the pair
0 1 , i i y y     is independent of selection into treatment. That is:  
 
1 0 , | i i i y y d   ^ =   i x x  (2.1) 
This is known as the “unconfoundedness” assumption, and it states that potential 
outcomes are independent of participation in the RBD program conditional on holding  i x fixed, 
where i x is the vector of observed characteristics (Imbens 2004). Within a group of 
observationally identical farmers, there are no confounding factors such as higher ability that 
might affect outcomes of interest while driving some individuals to participate in the RBD and 12 
 
others not to do so. Rather, after controlling for observable characteristics, whether a household 
is observed to be participating or not participating in the program is random.  
  As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), (2.1) can be restated as follows: 
  ( )
1 0 , | i i i y y d p   ^   x   (2.2) 
where ( ) ( ) 1| i p P d = = = i x x x is the propensity score, or the probability of participating in the 
RBD program given the observed values of thexvector. In other words, if unconfoundedness 
holds, we can recover unbiased estimated of program impacts by conditioning on the scalar 
propensity score rather than the entire vector of observed characteristics. 
  In order to condition on the propensity score, an additional assumption must be made: 
Assumption 2 - Overlap 
  ( ) 0 1 for all  . p < < x x   (2.3) 
This is the overlap assumption, and it insures that there are treatment and control households at 
all values ofxin the support of observable characteristics. 
If there are no unobserved factors correlated with both the outcome of interest and 
selection into the RBD program, then it is only the distribution of observed characteristics along 
with treatment status that determines the average outcome in any given group. This suggests that 
we could recover an unbiased estimate of the average outcome without treatment among the 
group of participating households by applying weights to the subsample of control households. If 
the weights adjust the distribution of observed characteristics in the control group to reflect that 
of the treatment group, then the weighted average outcome among control group households 13 
 
would be an unbiased estimate of the average untreated outcome among households participating 
in the RBD program. This is the intuition behind using weights that are based on the probability 
of being in the treatment group given observed characteristics, i.e., weights based on the 
propensity score. 
More formally, suppose we construct weights for households that did not participate in 
the RBD program that are equal to: 






  (2.4) 
We then take the weighted expectation of the outcome y among untreated households, multiplied 
by( ) 1 i d - , holding the xvector constant: 
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  (2.5) 
The second line is due to holding the x vector constant, and the third line comes from the fact 
that for control households the product of the observed outcome i y and ( ) 1 i d - is equal to the 
product of the potential outcome
0
i y and( ) 1 i d - . The fourth line stems from the fact that the 
propensity score is equal to the expected value of i d holding the x vector constant. The final term 
follows from unconfoundedness, i.e., the average untreated outcome conditional on x ought to be 14 
 
equal regardless of the decision to select into treatment. By the law of iterated expectations, 
taking the expected value of this last term over the distribution of x yields the average untreated 
outcome among participating households in the absence of the RBD program,
0 | 1
i i E y d   =   .  
 Equation (2.5) can be estimated using the observed outcomes among the control 
households, and an estimate of the propensity score. Suppose the population-level model for the 
decision to enroll in the RBD program follows a logit specification. Then we can write down the 
propensity score as: 

















  (2.6) 
Plugging the logit equation into the equation for the weights given in (2.4) yields: 
  ( )










  (2.7) 
Note that i x could include interactions and higher order terms based on a smaller set of 
observable characteristics, and as a result the linear term in parentheses in (2.6) need not be 
restrictive. Once the parameters of (2.6) are estimated, the fitted values  ( ) ˆ p x are used to 
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  (2.8) 
This is the difference in two sample averages. The first term is the average outcome among the 
treated households in the sample, and the second term is the sample version of the term in 15 
 
brackets in the first line of (2.5). The difference given in (2.8) will be a consistent estimator of 
the ATT if the model for the propensity score is correct and a law of large numbers can be 
applied to the two averages that appear in the formula.  
4.2  Linear regression 
Inverse propensity score weighting only yields consistent estimates of program impacts if we 
have the correct model for the propensity score. We may be more confident in our ability to 
construct a correct regression model for the conditional expectation of a given outcome of 
interest than in our ability to model the selection process. It turns out that inverse propensity 
score weighting and regression can be combined in a manner that yields an unbiased and 
consistent estimate of the ATT, as long as either the model for the propensity score or the 
regression model of the conditional expectation of the outcome is correct; this is the “double 
robustness” property of inverse propensity score weighted least squares (IPS-WLS) estimation 
(Wooldridge 2007).  
Consider the following regression model for the conditional expectation of the outcome 
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x x   α
x x   α
  (2.9) 
The first line of (2.9) specifies the conditional expectation of yields for the group of RBD 
participants in the absence of the RBD program, and the second line is the conditional 
expectation of yields for this same group when its members actually participate. Here it is 
assumed that the i x vector that appears in (2.9) is identical to that of (2.6), although there is no 
need for this to be the case. The vector contains the means of the i x variables within the 16 
 
population of participants. The parameter vector 2 α is the derivative of the conditional mean of 
the outcome with respect to the i x vector, and it captures how the conditional expectation changes 
in the absence of treatment as i x moves away from its mean. The vector ¢ 2 α captures this same 
effect when treatment is received; any difference between ¢ 2 α and 2 α can be attributed to 
interaction effects between the treatment and observed characteristics. 
By the law of iterated expectations, taking the expectation of the first line of (2.9) over 
the distribution ofxgives the expected value of i y for the group of participants when not enrolled 
in the RBD program, while the expected value of the outcome for the group of participants when 
the treatment is received can be derived similarly using the second line. The difference between 
these two expectations is the ATT, 1 a .  
4.3  The double robustness property of inverse propensity score weighted least squares 
regression 
Given the assumption of unconfoundedness,
0 0 | 1, | 0,
i i i i E y d E y d     = = =     x x , and the first line 
of (2.9) can be replaced with an equivalent expression that uses the population of non-participant 
households. This makes it possible to combine the two lines of (2.9) as: 
  [ ] ( ) 0 1 | i i i E y d d a a ¢ ¢ ¢ = + + + i 2 i 3 x x α x -  α   (2.10) 
The ATT is still given by 1 a . The vector 2 α is interpreted as before, and the sum of  2 α and
3 α is equal to  ¢ 2 α in (2.9). If the conditional expectation of i y is indeed equal to (2.10), then the 
ordinary least squares estimate 1 ˆ a will be consistent for the ATT. Furthermore, we can apply 
weights to the data and estimate the parameters of  (2.10) via weighted least squares. The 17 
 
consistency of 1 ˆ a will be unaffected when the regression model is the correct one for the 
conditional expectation (Greene 2003, 226). 
If the conditional mean is not linear, but we have the correct model for the propensity 
score, 1 ˆ a will still be a consistent estimate of the ATT if it is estimated via weighted least squares, 
where the weights for non-participant households are given by (2.4) and the true propensity score 
is replaced by its estimate. To see why, assume without loss of generality that there is only a 





















  (2.11) 
The interaction between i d and i x X - has dropped out because the latter is evaluated at i x X =
when solving for the intercept, where X is the average of x among RBD participants. The 
probability limit of the first term of (2.11) is the expected value of the treated outcome among 
households enrolled in the RBD program. The second term converges in probability to: 
  [ ] [ ] ( ) | i i i i E x d E xE d x x E xp x     = = =       (2.12) 
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Assuming that ( ) ( ) ˆ p x p x = , the probability limit of the first term is the expected value of the 
untreated outcome among households enrolled in the RBD program. By Slutsky’s theorem, the 
probability limit of the second term is equal to the probability limit of  2 ˆ a multiplied by: 
  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )




i i i i
p x p x
E x d E xE d x x E xp x
p x p x
     
  - = - = =         - -            
  (2.14) 
The second terms on the right hand side of each intercept formula are asymptotically equivalent. 
Taking the difference between the probability limits of the two intercepts therefore causes the 
second term to drop out of each, leaving: 
  ￿ 1 0
1 | 1 | 1 ATT
p





i y are the potential outcomes with and without treatment, respectively.  
4.4  Estimation and inference 
Estimating the parameters of the regression model using the IPS-WLS technique is 
straightforward. First, the logit model is estimated via maximum likelihood, and the fitted values 
of the propensity score are used to construct the weights for non-participant households. Next, 
the parameters of the regression model, including the ATT, are estimated by minimizing the 
weighted sum of squared residuals. Define w as the x vector augmented to include unity, and z as 
the x vector expanded to include unity, the treatment indicator i d , and the de-meaned covariates 
used in the regression model. Using this more compact notation, the objective function for the 
weighted regression can be written as: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ]
2
1






¢ ¢   + - -   ∑ i i w π z α   (2.16) 19 
 
The first term in brackets in (2.16) follows from the fact that the weights for non-participant 
households simplify to ( ) ˆ exp ¢ i w π .  
How to conduct statistical inference on ˆ αis less obvious, for two reasons. xxx if first 
order conditions for alpha depend on pi, must adjustust asump variance. second, nature of 
outcomes in this study may mean that there is dependence of the residuals across i.  
Taking derivatives of  and (2.16) with respect to the parameters of each gives the following set of 
first order conditions: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ]
1










w π z α   (2.17) 
If there are m parameters in the logit model and l parameters in the regression, then equations 
Error! Reference source not found. and is and (2.17) are ( ) 1 m´ and( ) 1 l´ vectors of first order 
conditions, respectively. Solving these equations for ˆ π and ˆ αgenerates the estimates of the model 
parameters. 
To find the variance of each element of ˆ π and ˆ α, we take a first order Taylor expansion 
around the true values of the parameters of each model, multiply by
1 2 N , and rearrange terms to 
yield: 
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where i w are the weights, and i H and  i G are the Hessian matrices for the logit and weighted least 
squares objective functions, respectively. Note that both Hessian matrices include derivatives of 
the first order conditions with respect to theπandαvectors, i.e., the i H and i G terms are
( ) ( ) l m l m + ´ + matrices. 
Applying the variance operator to (2.18) and (2.19) gives: 
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Wooldridge: IPW estimator is asymptotically normal, with a variance that is weakly lower when 
the estimated propensity score is used rather than the true propensity score, implying that we can 
ignore the fact that the p-score is estimated when conducting inference. The formula given for 
the variance of the estimator assumes that the observations are independent draws. This could be 
adopted for the case of dependent observations by taking the sum of the score function within 
each cluster, and then taking the plugging in these super observations into the variance formula. 
The sum of the outer product of the scores would then be done over the number of clusters, and 
then divided by the number of clusters. But with spatial correlation the problem is more 
complex. If we could divide the sampling area into non-overlapping regions within which 
unobservables may be correlated, but with zero correlation in the residuals between the regions, 21 
 
then this same methodology would apply. But completely eliminating correlations in 
unobservables at the borders is obviously a strong and unrealistic assumption.   
If observations could be ordered as in a time-series, then robust inference could be conducted 
with minimal assumptions about the nature of spatial dependence by applying the Newey-West 
variance-covariance matrix formula to the residuals generated by the weighted least-squares 
estimation procedure described above. The Newey-West formula assumes that the covariance 
between any two residuals in a time series is a decreasing function of the number of periods 
between them, and is assumed to be zero beyond a given number of lags that must be selected by 
the econometrician. The formula for the Newey-West estimator is: 
The variance-covariance matrix estimator consists of two terms: an average of the variances for 
each of the residuals with themselves, and a weighted average of the covariances between each 
residual and those falling before it in the time series. The weighting function takes a values of 1 
for lags of a single period, and then decreases in steps of 1/(1+p) to zero for lags greater than p. 
is a decreasing in the size of the lag, and is equal to zero for lags greater than p. The Newey-
West estimator is robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the level of each individual 
observation, as well as autocorrelation of any structure, assuming that dependence between 
residuals is truly a decreasing observation of distance and the value p chosen by the 
econometrician is large enough to capture the underlying lag structure.   
Spatial dependence is more complex that autocorrelation within a time series. While the distance 
between observations in a time series can be captured by a number of equidistant steps on a line, 
spatial data will be located in two or three dimensions, with distances between neighboring 
observations varying across the sample space. Several studies have adapted the Newey-West 22 
 
procedure to spatial data, taking these unique characteristics into account. Examples include 
Conley (1999), who replaces the weight in the Newey-West formulation with a two-dimensional 
equivalent, and Kelejian and Prucha (2007), who use the Euclidean distance between 
observations as the argument in a Gaussian kernel which serves as the weighting function. 
Analogous to the choice of p in the Newey-West formula, these studies choose a maximum 
distance outside of which the residuals of any two observations are assumed to be uncorrelated.  
Hypothesis testing using Newey-West style standard errors in a spatial context relies upon the 
asymptotic normality of model parameters. It is unclear to what extent these asymptotic results 
will hold when using small samples. Firstly, robust standard errors will have higher sampling 
variability than conventional standard errors, and in small samples such as the one used in this 
paper, may lead to over rejection of the null hypothesis of no program effect. Secondly, 
statistical tests of the null hypothesis of no effect based on asymptotic theory generate 
significance levels that are biased relative to the true significance level of the test (Cameron, 
2005, Chapter 11). For example, in a one-tailed test, we may think that we are rejecting the null 
at a 5 percent significance level if the calculated t-statistic exceeds the 95
th percentile of the 
standard normal distribution. But the true significance level may be larger. Thus it is no surprise 
that the performance of robust standard errors is mixed in finite samples. In the context of spatial 
data, Bester et al. () present simulation evidence with a sample size of over 600 that normal 
approximations to the true parameter distribution lead to substantial over-rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no effect. They present an alternative method of variance estimation based upon .  
Alternatively, robust standard errors could be used to construct a test statistic which is 
asymptotically pivotal (i.e., does not rely on unknown parameters) which can then be 
bootstrapped. The  23 
 
 
Conley (1999) constructs an index of “economic distance” for each observation in a data set; the 
example used in the application presented in the paper is the cost of transporting physical capital 
between countries. This makes it possible to reduce the dimensionality of spatial data on place 
observations on a continuous, one-dimensional index. Construction of Newey-West style 
standard errors is straightforward. Kelejian and Prucha (2007) assume that the influence of the 
residual of one observation on that of another is a decreasing function of distance, and is equal to 
zero outside of a certain range. This range is akin to the maximum lag length used in 
construction of Newey-West standard errors. Kelejian and Prucha then construct a Newey-West 
style variance-covariance matrix estimator, where the weights in the covariance term are given 
by the Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth equal to the maximum range within which the residual 
of one observation may be correlated with that of another.   
5  Results 
5.1  Data 
The sample was drawn from lists of rice producers provided by farmer cooperatives participating 
in the RBD program. These lists were pooled into a single database of farmers belonging to the 
11 cooperatives originally chosen to participate in the RBD program and thought to satisfy the 
criteria listed in above in section 2.2 for program participation. Of these 11 cooperatives, one 
was eliminated because it had dropped out of the program partway through the agricultural year, 
and two others were eliminated because no names of non-participants farmers were made 
available. The remaining eight cooperatives served as the basis of the sample.  
During the process of data collection, a large number of farmers were replaced at the 
request of MCC due to not satisfying program eligibility criteria; the program was to last for two 24 
 
years, but farmers found to violate program criteria would be disqualified in their first year of 
participation. MCC wanted to maintain the option of conducting a second round of data 
collection, and in order to avoid high rates of attrition in the panel or shifting the split between 
treatment and control observations sharply towards the latter in the second year, it was decided 
that farmers not meeting program criteria would be dropped from the sample. Nearly 50 percent 
of the original sample had to be replaced, with the most common cause being failure to satisfy 
program criteria with respect to land tenure status, followed by households being listed more 
than once on the roster provided by MCC. To round out the sample, a small number of farmers 
not belonging to cooperatives but satisfying other program criteria were interviewed; 
enumerators located a number of such farmers in the field, and a random subsample of this group 
was chosen to be interviewed.  
The data were collected in a single household visit shortly after the post-harvest stage of 
the agricultural calendar, allowing sufficient time for farmers to have marketed their production 
of rice. To estimate program impacts, we must adjust for observable differences between 
treatment and control households. The danger of using data collected after the intervention is that 
we will hold variables constant that were affected by the treatment and are correlated with 
outcomes of interest;
5 this would eliminate a portion of the impact from the estimated effect, and 
potentially introduce other sources of bias (Rosenbaum 1984). Recall questions were asked about 
purchases and sales of consumer durables, agricultural implements, and land in order to 
reconstruct the wealth of each household prior to implementation of the RBD program. These are 
major sources of wealth and it seems reasonable to expect households to remember substantial 
changes in asset holdings over a one year period.  
                                                 
5 I will use the term “outcome of interest” to refer to any variable for which we might want to measure impacts of 
program participation. 25 
 
These data were used to construct indices of agricultural and non-agricultural wealth via 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The indices explain 26.23 percent and 30.25 percent of 
variation in agricultural and non-agricultural wealth in the sample, respectively.
6 For data on the 
agricultural year immediately prior to the RBD program, households were asked about loans 
taken out for agricultural activities, changes in household membership and demographics, sown 
area of marketed crops, and rice production. Other potential explanatory variables, such as non-
agricultural and unearned income, geographic location, sown rice area suffering unanticipated 
production shocks, and expectations regarding rice production levels enter into the different 
models at their reported levels for the 2009-2010 agricultural year. 
5.2  Impact on rice yields 
5.3  Impact on rice revenue 
5.4  Impact on rice net revenue 
5.5  Costs 
6  Robustness checks 
6.1  Indirect test of identifying assumptions 
Agricultural extension often has a large public goods aspect to it (Anderson and Feder 2004). If 
this were true in the context of the RBD program, then this would violate the assumption of no 
externalities. This assumption can be tested by estimating the impact of non-participation among 
eligible farmers, i.e., comparing the average outcome of eligible non-participants with the 
counterfactual outcome among this same group that would have obtained had the RBD program 
never existed. The latter is estimated using the group of ineligibles. 
                                                 
6 PCA maps variables into a series of orthogonal components explaining successively smaller shares of the total 
variation of whatever is being indexed. Härdle (2007) offers a more detailed explanation of PCA with examples of 
applications. 26 
 
Estimate two sets of results: One with coop members and coop fixed effects. Another with the 
whole sample.  
7  Seeking an explanation for the results 
8  Conclusion 